# RAFT: Hardware-assisted Dynamic Information Flow Tracking for Runtime Protection on RISC-V

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# Dynamic Taint Analysis

```
struct SAMPLE{
      char buffer[20];
      int private_data;
    }:
5
    int test()
      struct SAMPLE s:
7
      s.private_data = 5; // source ①
8
      signed char input_char:
9
      int i = 0:
      while ((input_char = fgetc(fp)) != EOF) // source ②
        s.buffer[i] = input_char;
        i++:
14
      int temp = s.private_data;
16
      process(temp); // sink ③
      return 0: // sink ④
18
```

# Key ElementsTaint sourceTaint propagation

• Taint sink

## Applications

- Exploit detection
- Privacy leakage detection
- Data corruption detection



- Software-based DTA tools often suffer from unbearably high performance overhead
  - Due to Dynamic Binary Instrumentation (DBI) or Virtual Machine (VM)
  - Imposing  $\sim$ 4x or even  $\sim$ 10x slowdown
- A research interest emerged in developing hardware accelerators to improve the performance of DTA

## Hardware-assisted DTA



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## Hardware-assisted DTA on RISC-V

• Utilizing a coprocessor to perform analysis logic on RISC-V

## Problem 1

- Non-negligible performance overhead ( ~20%)
  - Mainly coming from frequent memory operations
  - Reasonable for program analysis but is still unacceptable when protecting time-critical applications at runtime (e.g., medical applications and vehicle control units)





## Hardware-assisted DTA on RISC-V

• Utilizing a coprocessor to perform analysis logic on RISC-V

## Problem 2

- High memory overhead
  - For example, a flat, fixed-size structure: directly mapping the tags of every memory address into shadow memory requires massive storage space





- A flexible hardware-assisted DTA framework on RISC-V to provide runtime protection for embedded applications without delay to the programs
- A new tag-storage mechanism with hybrid byte/variable granularity to reduce the size of tag storage



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## Tag-storage Mechanism



#### Observation

• The way to access an allocated heap memory is usually through the start address stored on the stack

#### Design

• Utilizing the information on the stack to represent the tags of heap data



## Tag-storage Mechanism



## Tag Storage File (TSF)

Tagging program memory

- 2-bit tag:
  - 1 bit: taint or non-taint
  - 1 bit: address or data

## Shadow Register File (SRF)

Tagging general-purpose registers

- 64-bit tag:
  - 1 bit: taint or non-taint
  - I bit: address or data
  - 62 bits: the location of the address stored on the stack



## Trace Unit



• Collecting the runtime information about the main core and committing it to the coprocessor



# Filter Unit



- Filtering out DTA-unrelated instructions that do not involve tag propagation
  - Manually instrumenting two custom instructions before and after the block of unrelated instructions

# Control Unit



• Controlling analysis logic

- 1. Dequeue an instruction and Decode it
- 2. Query tag propagation rules
- 3. Perform DTA operations

$$\begin{array}{l} Tag(rd) \leftarrow Tag(rs1); \\ Tag(rd) \leftarrow Tag(rs1) \lor Tag(rs2); \\ Tag(rd) \leftarrow Tag(Mem[rs1+offset]); \\ Tag(Mem[rd+offset]) \leftarrow Tag(rs1); \end{array}$$



# Control Unit



- Pipelining the above tasks
- Moving tags from shadow memory to the coprocessor



# Interrupt Manager



- Managing the coprocessor interrupt
  - Security violation (e.g., return address comes from the system input)
  - Instruction Queue is full



## Implementation

- Implementing our prototype based on PHMon (USENIX Security'20)
  - An efficient programmable hardware monitor to enforce an event-action monitoring model
  - Utilizing it to flexibly configure tag propagation rules and trace the runtime information
- ${\rm RAFT}$  is deployed on the RISC-V Rocket emulator and Xilinx Kintex-7 FPGA KC705 evaluation board

Instruction	Usage
taint rs1, rs2	Mark the taintedness
src rs1, rs2	Mark heap pointer variables
arg rd, rs1	Assist tag propagation
open/close zero, zero	Filter out DIFT-unrelated instructions
sink rs1, rs2	Perform security checks
base $fp/gp$ , $rs2$	Pass the frame pointer and global pointer to the coprocessor

• Custom instructions (RISC-V ISA)

• Toolchain (LLVM 12.0.1) and OS support (Linux v5.4)



## Comparison against Traditional Storage

- Shadow Memory: 22.54% overhead on CoreMark and 26.37% overhead on NBench
- ${\rm RAFT:}~<\!\!0.1\%$  overhead on CoreMark and NBench
- $\rm RAFT$  effectively cuts down the performance overhead from  $>\!20\%$  to  $<\!0.1\%$  with our new tag-storage mechanism





## Performance Evaluation

• SPEC CINT 2006: 0.13% overhead on average



- We set up a main core with a peak instruction processing rate 2x and 3x that of the coprocessor and rerun the CoreMark
  - RAFT still introduces negligible performance overhead

- $\bullet\,$  An extra usage of 34.04% LUTs and 93.17% FFs
- 2.31% power overhead

	Whole System		Dowow
	Slice LUTs	Slice Registers	rower
Without RAFT	58,442	29,445	3.46 W
With RAFT	78,355	56,879	3.54 W
%	+ 34.07%	+ 93.17%	+ 2.31%



- A medical embedded application OpenSyringePump
  - Detecting a non-control data attack by exploiting a buffer overflow vulnerability
- 5 known CVEs

ID	CVE ID	Program	Vulnerability	Detection
1	CVE-2009-4496	Boa	Information Leakage	$\checkmark$
2	CVE-2014-8503	Size	Buffer Overflow	$\checkmark$
3	CVE-2016-3186	Gif2tiff	Buffer Overflow	$\checkmark$
4	CVE-2018-17100	Ppm2tiff	Integer Overflow	$\checkmark$
5	CVE-2010-0001	Gzip	Integer Underflow	$\checkmark$



## Conclusion

- A flexible hardware-assisted DTA framework that provides runtime protection for embedded applications without delay to the programs
- A new storage mechanism with hybrid byte/variable granularity
- A prototype on the RISC-V Rocket emulator and FPGA development board



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https://github.com/Compass-All/Raft

## Thanks!

You can reach me at 12032879@mail.sustech.edu.cn for follow-up questions

I am looking for PhD positions in System Security





