The Internet of Things





Steven M. Bellovin __ November 20, 2016 __ 1

What is the "Internet of Things"?

- Non-computing devices...
- ... with CPUs
- ... and connectivity
- (Without connectivity, it's a simple *embedded system*)
- Examples: thermostats, fitness sensors, home appliances, TVs, cars, light switches, toys, medical devices (including implanted ones), etc.



Embedded Systems

- Dedicated CPU for particular purpose
- Used since the late 1970s
- A CPU and some one-time programming is cheaper than random logic
- Used when modestly complex decisions are needed



Security Issues

- Embedded and IoT systems run programs
- Such programs can be (and frequently are) buggy
- Buggy code is often insecure code
- But—does the attacker have *access*?



Back to Our Threat Model

- What is the attacker's access?
 - Break into your house?
 - Send you malicious TV programs?
 - Plant a malicious radio transmitter near your device?
 - Hack into your device via the Internet?
 - Hack into some cloud server?
- Different devices have different risks—I'm not worried about someone breaking into my house to attack my coffee maker (though there have been reports of malware-infected e-cigarettes)



Attacks

- Default passwords
- Fake firmware
- Ordinary hacking
- Data-driven attacks



Why is This Different?

- Many people never change (or don't know of) the password
- Most people don't think about the security of, say, their TV
- There's no antivirus software for IoT computers
- Much IoT software is never patched



The Patch Problem

- People don't know about installing patches
- Some devices aren't easy to patch—you need an administrative interface to tell it to find and install the patch
- Old models—software versions—aren't patched
- The lifespan of most gadgets is longer than the software support lifetime from the manufacturer
- There are *always* new models
- Six months after I bought a new printer, there was a new model that was 25% cheaper.)



Patching: Economically Infeasible?

- Vendors buy newer chips, if for no other reason than that the older ones are discontinued by hardware manufacturers
- Newer versions of their software take advantage of the newer chips—newer instructions, higher performance, more RAM, etc.
- At some point, the code won't run on older chips
- The vendor could, of course, port fixes to all previous releases of their code—but what's their economic incentive?
- Many vendors are invisible to consumers; there's no repeat business, and hence no brand value



Famous Holes

- VoIP phones (hacked here at CU)
- HP printers (hacked here at CU)
- Routers with (deliberate?) back doors
- Baby monitor cameras
- Car tire pressure monitors
- Tooth brushes!
- Many more—and the Internet of Things is just getting started...




IoT Architecture

- Note: this is a plausible but *imaginary* architecture
- Most of these pieces exist, but may not be connected as I envision
 - *Things* talk to *Hubs*
 - Hubs talk to Vendor Servers
 - Managers talk to Things via Hubs



Hubs


- Many Things don't talk to the Internet directly
- Wrong interface, e.g., Bluetooth instead of WiFi
- Don't support full TCP/IP stacks (though they could)
- Don't implement security, user interface, etc.






Home IoT

- Local managers (which may be apps on a phone or computer) talk to hubs
- Hubs talk to devices via private protocols
- Hubs talk to vendor servers
- Things may talk to each other via hubs, but probably use the vendor servers
- Vendor servers may talk to each other








Why Have Vendor Servers?

- Many devices cannot be called directly (e.g., Nest thermostats), because of limited battery power: they're not always online
- NATs prevent direct inward calls from outside of the house
- Devices may not have enough CPU power for some tasks (e.g., voice recognition on Amazon Echo)
- Vendors like the service model—it forces users to keep coming back
- Vendors like to gather data (with all that implies for privacy)



(Privacy and the IoT)

- Some of the data captured is scary, e.g., on a Samsung smart TV
- Logs when, where, how long you use your TV
- Facial recognition camera (data nominally stays local)
- Voice command: "Please be aware that if your spoken words include personal or other sensitive information, that information will be among the data captured and transmitted to a third party"
- Hackers can retrieve all of that data from the TV (http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/ im-terrified-my-new-tv-why-im-scared-turn-thing
- Vizio explicitly sells TV viewing habits
 (https://www.propublica.org/article/
 own-a-vizio-smart-tv-its-watching-you)






Privacy and Servers

- The server-oriented architecture means that there's an easy place to violate privacy
- Architecturally, the server *must* know everything
- Someone has to pay for the server complex—and the choices are (a) a higher initial price for the Thing, (b) charging for server access, (c) paying for it from newer revenues—or (d) selling customer information...
- Some people speak of "the net of a million spies"



The Full Architecture





Any Component Can Be Attacked

- Things
- Hubs
- Servers
- Links?



Link Security

- It's relatively easy to encrypt links
- It's probably not that important, *if* people have secure home WiFi networks
- But—primary exposure from a compromised link is the devices at either end, including sending corrupted firmware
- Also: is there authentication data, such as passwords?



Ownership

- Who can control a Thing? Obviously, only the owner should be allowed to
- How does the Thing know who the owner is?
- What if the Thing is sold? What if the house is sold?
- Remember that Things have little or no user interface
- Solution is Thing-dependent, but will frequently rely on a physical "reset everything" request



Authentication

- Do *not* use passwords for Thing-to-Hub or Hub-to-Server authentication
- How do Things connected to different Hubs and different Servers authenticate each other?
- More precisely, how do they establish that they have the same owner?
- Complex cryptographic protocols may be necessary



Corrupted Things

- Consequences are Thing-dependent
- Obvious risk: private data collected by the Thing
- Possible risk: physical devices controlled by the Thing (this is a *cyber-physical system*)
- Possible risk: the human reaction to corrupted data
- Can attack Hubs, and possibly Servers via the Hubs
- Denial of service



Corrupted Hubs

- Can attack Things or Servers
- Can attack other Hubs, Manager, or other home computers
- (The computers are already at considerable risk...)
- Can change access control rules



Access Control

- Users may have complex access control rules
- Who can change the thermostat? Within what limits?
- What about read access? (The Supreme Court has worried that "at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath" is private information.)
- Note: we know that setting access control rules properly is very hard



Corrupted Servers

- Biggest risk: corrupted firmware—but can be digitally signed
- Can send evil commands to Things
- Private data can be stolen from them
- Authentication data can be stolen



Defenses

- Request filters
- Cryptography
- Authorization
- Intrusion detection



Request Filters

- Things should incorporate sanity filters
- Example: Nest thermostats reject preposterous settings and will *always* activate if temperatures go outside certain ranges
- But—it isn't always possible to detect bad commands



Cryptography

- All messages should be cryptographically authenticated
- Encrypt messages to the extent possible—but don't cripple the IDS
- Avoid passwords—but Servers probably have to accept passwords, to allow direct logins from web browsers



Authorization

- Don't do authorization on the Servers—they're more exposed to attack
- Authorization is intimately tied to ownership—must be possible to buy and sell Things
- Tie authorization to physical possession of the device



Denial of Service

- By definition, Things are networked
- Once hacked, they can send out lots of garbage packets
- The largest DDoS (distributed denial of service) attack ever launched came from hacked cameras and DVRs



Intrusion Detection

- There are many avenues for attack, and many components
- Use intrusion detection to detect ongoing attacks or other compromised components
- Example: alert the owner (via the Manager) if a sanity filter is used
- It might be a real, physical failure, e.g., the furnace has failed, so the house is too cold, or it might be an attack—but either way, the owner needs to know



Notifying the Owner

- How do you notify the owner?
- Messages? Do people look at their thermostats?
- Do they know how to respond?
- (What would *you* do if your phone popped up an alert that your five-year-old thermostat had been hacked?



How Are We Doing?

- The industry isn't doing a very good job
- Elementary cryptography isn't being used, or isn't being used properly
- Too much software is never updated
- Insufficient attention to threat model



Security Analysis: Internet Thermostats

- I recently decided to investigate Internet thermostats
- Control and monitor my house temperature remotely
- Are there security risks?



One Popular Brand

- Some thermostats have built-in web servers
- Simplest mode: direct connection to thermostat
- Alternate mode: thermostat and user connect to company's web site; company can generate alert emails
- Note: no hub for this brand



What's at Risk?

- Turning off someone's heat in the middle of winter?
- Turning on the heat in the summer?
- Run heat and air conditioning simultaneously?



Local Management

Thermostat Statu	-	11-11-11-11
Temperature	Sunday, May 20, 2007 7:04:59 AM	
Zone Temperature	70.4°F	10, 20, 200, 110 110, 1
Local	70.4°F	
Override		
Cool Setting	78.0°F	
Heat Setting	68.0°F	
Hold Mode	Off	
Schedule Settings	0	
Day Class / Period	In / Morn	
Cool	78.0°F	
Heat	68.0°F	
HVAC Settings		
HVAC State	Off	
HVAC Mode	Auto	
Fan State	Off	
Fan Mode	Auto	
Alarm Status		
Low Temperature	ОК	
High Temperature	OK	
Filter change	ОК	
	Refresh	



Local Problems

- No https people can eavesdrop
- Uses "Basic Authentication":

"The most serious flaw in Basic authentication is that it results in the essentially cleartext transmission of the user's password over the physical network....

"Because Basic authentication involves the cleartext transmission of passwords it SHOULD NOT be used (without enhancements) to protect sensitive or valuable information."

• No read-only mode





Remote Management

Edit View	Favorites Tools Help	arch 🤺 Favorites 🙆 🔗	. 🗟 🔳 . 🗖 🔀	
	access.proliphix.com/Frame.php?Se			
ess enttps://a	access.prolipnix.com/Frame.pnp?se	rialivo=B3-0F-8A-A7&Proxy=1	GO	
P	Remote Management		VIEW Devices Logout	
ROLIPH	IX	8		
NT20	Thermostat Statu	IS	Kitche	
STATUS &	Temperature	Wednesday, Novemb	er 09, 2005 11:31:57 A	
CONTROL	Zone Temperature	70.0°F		
General Settings	Local	70.0°F		
	Override			
SETBACK	Cool Setting	78.0°F	78 🛩 °F	
CHEDULES	Heat Setting	68.0°F	68 💙 °F	
Network Settings	Hold Mode	Off	Off 🖌	
Advanced Settings	Schedule Settings	5		
	Day Class / Period	Out / Day		
SENSOR	Cool	78.0°F		
Settings	Heat	68.0°F		
Remote Access	HVAC Settings			
	HVAC State	Off		
Password Settings	HVAC Mode	Auto	Auto 🐱	
Logout	Fan Mode	Auto	Auto 🛩	
	Alarm Status			
	Low Temperature	OK		
	High Temperature	OK		
	Filter change	OK		
		Refresh	Submit	



Remote Problems

- Https but only to the server
- Unencrytped traffic from the server to the thermostats
- (The words "security" and "encryption" are not mentioned in the API manual...)
- Passwords are sent in the clear across the Internet
- Passwords are stored in bulk on the server



Privacy Issues

- Energy consumption patterns
- Al Gore's thermostat setting? Japanese office thermostat settings?
- Vacation schedules (burglary risk?)



Defenses

- Can't touch thermostat software
- Add layering access controls on top of built-in controls
- Use crypto tunnels
- Filter setting change requests



Last-Ditch Defenses

- Add a low-limit heat switch in parallel
- Add a high-limit heat switch in series
- These are hardware devices, not software
- Protect against bugs
- What if they fail?
- Independent failure modes; protect against each other



How to Analyze This?

- Hard to know all the threats
- Approach: see what is made available, and ask who might want it
- Reason by analogy and effect
- Check the "gold standard" (Au): Authentication, Authorization, Audit

