



# Viden: Attacker Identification on In- Vehicle Networks

Kyong-Tak Cho and Kang G. Shin

# Content

- Motivation
- CAN
- Viden
- Evaluation
- Drawback
- Future Work

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

# Motivation

- ✓ Advancements in Automotive Technology
- ✓ Drawbacks in Present Defense Schemes

# What is ECU?

- Electronic Control Unit(ECU)
- Types of ECU's
- Threats

# What is ECU?



# Related Work

- Clock based Intrusion detection system
  - Clock Skews
  - Works only in Periodic message
  - Attacker information evaded –a periodic messages
- Mean square voltage measurements
  - Works only with slow speed (10kbps)
- Supervised Batch learning Algorithm
  - Not practical

# **VIDEN: Voltage based attacker IDENTification**


- Voltage measurements output by transmitter ECU
- Creates Voltage profiles (Fingerprints) based on voltage instance
- Adaptive signal processing( Online learning)
- Defense mechanism against
  - Naïve adversary
  - Timing-aware adversary
  - Timing-voltage-aware adversary

# Content


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# Controller Area Network Protocol

Without CAN



With CAN



# CAN typical application Schematic





Figure 4: CAN typical application schematic.


# CAN output Voltage



(b) CAN output voltages when sending a message.




(a) Transceiver schematic.



(b) When sending a 0-bit.

Figure 2: Output schematics of a CAN transceiver.

# CAN Data Frame



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# System and Threat model

CAN bus consideration for system model

- Fingerprinting device- IDS, timing and voltage based
- ECU attached only through CAN bus

Threats involved are naïve, timing-aware and timing-voltage-aware adversaries

# High-Level Overview of Viden

Involves Four Phases

- Phase 1: Learning ACK Threshold
- Phase 2: Derives Voltage instances
- Phase 3: Creates Voltage Profiles
- Phase 4: Verification

# Phase 1: Learning ACK Threshold

- Measuring dominant voltages
- Extracting Non-ACK voltages




Figure 6: Viden measuring CANH voltages.

# Phase 2: Deriving A Voltage Instance

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## Algorithm 1 Dispersion Update

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```
1: function UPDATEDISPERSION( $V, \Lambda, P^*$ )
2:   return  $\Lambda \leftarrow \Lambda + \alpha(P^* - \frac{\#(V < \Lambda)}{\#V})^3$            ▷ Adjust tracking position
3: end function
4: if #measured CANH and CANL voltages both  $\geq \kappa$  then
5:    $V_H, V_L \leftarrow \{\text{past } \kappa R \text{ CANH, CANL measurements}\}$ 
6:    $F_3 \leftarrow \text{UPDATEDISPERSION}(V_H, F_3, 0.75)$ 
7:    $F_4 \leftarrow \text{UPDATEDISPERSION}(V_L, F_4, 0.25)$ 
8:    $F_5 \leftarrow \text{UPDATEDISPERSION}(V_H, F_5, 0.9)$ 
9:    $F_6 \leftarrow \text{UPDATEDISPERSION}(V_L, F_6, 0.1)$ 
10: end if
```

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# Phase 3: Attacker Identification

$$CVD_x[n] = CVD_x[n-1] + \Delta[n](1 - \nu_x[n]/\nu_x^*),$$

$$\Psi[n] = \sum_{x=1}^6 CVD_x[n].$$

$$\Psi_{accum}[n] = \sum_{k=1}^n \Psi[k]$$

# Phase 4: Verification

- Birthday paradox
  - ✓ Voltage profile collision
  - ✓ Multiple ECUs can have same profile
  - ✓ Narrower set up of ECU to look at

## Target impersonation


- ✓ Further verification required to complement the Phase 1-3

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# Evaluation

- Against Timing adversary
- Against Timing and Voltage adversary



(a) CAN bus prototype.



(b) 2013 Honda Accord.



(c) 2015 Chevrolet Trax.



(d) Connection to the vehicle.

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# Drawbacks

- Attack from another network ECU
- Atleast One Voltage profile
- No message send from the ECU – Inaccurate identification
- Voltage profile adjustments

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# Question



**THANK YOU**