

# TrustLogin: Securing Password-Login On Commodity Operating Systems

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# Overview of The Talk

- ▶ Motivation
- ▶ Background: System Management Mode (SMM)
- ▶ System Framework
- ▶ Evaluation Results
- ▶ Conclusions and Future Directions

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# Motivation

## Keylogger examples

- ▶ Keylogger malware found on UC Irvine health center in May 2014, and about two thousand students were impacted [1]
- ▶ Attackers have stolen credit card information for customers who shopped at 63 Barnes & Noble stores using keyloggers [2]
- ▶ A case study has shown that 10,775 unique bank account credentials were stolen by keyloggers in a seven-month period [3]

Protecting login credentials is a critical part of daily life

# Motivation

- ▶ OS as a trusted computing base, which has a large amount of source code
  - ▶ Linux kernel has 17M lines of code
  - ▶ CVE shows 240 vulnerabilities for the Linux kernel
- ▶ An attacker can compromise the OS and install a stealthy keylogger
  - ▶ Banking, SSH login passwords

# Our Approach

We present TrustLogin, a framework to securely perform login operations using System Management Mode (SMM)

- ▶ Prevent rootkits and stealthy keyloggers without trusting the OS
- ▶ Does not change any software on the client and server sides
- ▶ Transparent to users and applications

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# Background: System Management Mode


System Management Mode (SMM) is special CPU mode existing in x86 architecture, and it can be used as a **hardware isolated execution environment**.

- ▶ Originally designed for implementing system functions (e.g., power management)
- ▶ Isolated System Management RAM (SMRAM) that is inaccessible from OS
- ▶ Only way to enter SMM is to trigger a System Management Interrupt (SMI)
- ▶ Executing RSM instruction to resume OS (Protected Mode)


# Background: System Management Mode

## Approaches for Triggering a System Management Interrupt (SMI)

- ▶ Software-based: Write to an I/O port specified by Southbridge datasheet (e.g., 0x2B for Intel)
- ▶ Hardware-based: Network card, keyboard, hardware timers



# Background: Software Layers



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# System Framework

- ▶ SMM provides a secure world; we move the security sensitive operations into it.




Figure: Architecture of TrustLogin

## 3 Steps for a password-login

- ▶ Entering secure input mode: Ctrl+Alt+1
- ▶ Intercepting keystrokes and generating placeholders
- ▶ Intercepting network packets

# Case Study of TrustLogin

- ▶ Legacy Applications: FTP
  - ▶ Unencrypted packets
- ▶ Secure Applications: SSH
  - ▶ encrypted packets
  - ▶ session key searching
- ▶ TrustLogin requires application-specific efforts

# Ensuring the Trust Path

## Mitigating spoofing attacks

- ▶ LED lights:
  - ▶ Showing a special sequence of Num, Caps, and Scroll locks
  - ▶ User defines the sequence
- ▶ PC speaker:
  - ▶ Playing a melody (e.g., C major scale)

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# Effectiveness of TrustLogin

- ▶ Testing TrustLogin against Keyloggers on Windows and Linux Platforms
  - ▶ Windows: Free Keylogger Pro version 1.0
  - ▶ Linux: Logkeys version 0.1.1a

Keyloggers can only record random strings with TrustLogin enabled

Table: Breakdown of TrustLogin Runtime

<b>Operations</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>STD</b>
Keyboard SMI handler	32.58 <i>ms</i>	3.68
NIC SMI handler	29.67 $\mu s$	1.18
SMM Switching	3.29 $\mu s$	0.08
SMM Resume	4.58 $\mu s$	0.10

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# Conclusions and Future Directions

- ▶ We presented TrustLogin, a novel framework for securing password-login via System Management Mode
  - ▶ It can prevent rootkits from stealing sensitive data from the local host
  - ▶ It does not change any software on the client and server sides
  - ▶ It is transparent to users and applications
- ▶ Defend against phishing attacks by validating the destination IP/hostname
- ▶ Protect other sensitive data like password-logins on browsers and banking transactions

# References I

- [1] "Keylogger Malware Found on UC Irvine Health Center Computers," <http://www.scmagazine.com/keylogger-malware-found-on-three-uc-irvine-health-center-computers/article/347204/>.
- [2] "Credit Card Data Breach at Barnes & Noble Stores," [http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/24/business/hackers-get-credit-data-at-barnes-noble.html?\\_r=3&](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/24/business/hackers-get-credit-data-at-barnes-noble.html?_r=3&).
- [3] T. Holz, M. Engelberth, and F. Freiling, "Learning More About the Underground Economy: A Case-Study of Keyloggers and Dropzones," in *Proceedings of The 14th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS'09)*, 2009.

Thank you!

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# Questions?