

Leave Me Alone: App-level Protection Against Runtime Information Gathering on Android



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RIG Attacks

Runtime-Information-Gathering (RIG)

- Collect runtime information from target app (the victim)
- Directly steal or indirectly infer sensitive user information
- 1) Design weaknesses of the OS shared communication channels such as Bluetooth
- 2) Side channels memory and network-data usages



Android Permission Issues

A malicious app needs to run side-by-side with the target app (the victim) to collect its runtime information.

A malicious app can abuse the permission it gets "to directly collect sensitive data from the target app running in the foreground."

RIG attacks exploit apps to obtain sensitive user data "ranging from phone conversations to health information;"

A game app with the Bluetooth permission for connecting to its playpad can also download patient data from a Bluetooth glucose meter."



Android-based Internet of Things (IoT)

1. Belkin NetCam Wi-Fi Camera with Night Vision

Designed for home surveillance and motion detection Report to the house owner remotely




2. Nest Protect

Shipped 440,000 of its smoke alarms in the United States between Nov. 2013 and Apr. 2014





NetCam Communication Model



NetCam Attacks



- Utilize two side channels
 - Traffic statistics: tep snd and tep rev
 - CPU usage: /proc/<pid>/stat

Three steps

- Infer if anybody is at home
- Mute alarm



https://sites.google.com/site/appguaridan/

Motion Detection







How to Protect from RIG attack?





Previous Works

- > Enhancing access control causes compatibility issues
 - + Prevent information leaks during security-critical operations such as phone calls
 - + Remove public resources that could be used for a side-channel analysis
 - Inevitably make the system less usable
 - Cause compatibility issues



Previous Works

Modify OS

Complicated and painful (Android OS ecosystem: fragmentation)

- -New protection takes a long time before it can reach Android devices worldwide;
- -New RIG attacks continue to be brought to the spotlight;
- -It is less clear what an app can do by itself to control its information exposed by the OS.




Researchers proposed solution

App Guardian

App Guardian






- Information Gathering
 - Permissions, side-channels
- 2. Install / Run time features
- 3. Report suspicious apps
- 4. kill suspicious app
- 5. Principal finished
- 6. Resume suspicious app

Grant Guardian a set of permissions

- KILL_BACKGROUND_PROCESSES for closing other third-party apps
- SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW for popping up an alert to the user
- INTERNET to access internet
- GET_TASK for getting top activity
- BIND_NOTIFICATION_LISTENER_SERVICE for controlling notifications




Life cycle of Guardian Protection





Monitoring





Entering the ward


WARD MODE



BACKGROUND APPS

Entering the ward

oom_adj score (-17 ~ 15)



Exiting the ward

WARD MODE







HOME - WAIT - KILL



Impacts on Performance

- Close an app which might be restarted later
 - + App states are well preserved
 - Take longer time than Switch to foreground

App	Restart (s)	Switch (s)
Subway Surf	9.76	2.89
Mx Player	1.15	0.55
Flashlight	1.27	0.68
Shazam	2.18	0.77
RunKeeper	4.02	1.35
Bible.is	2.47	0.58
Chase	1.94	0.75
Duolingo	2.92	0.95
PicsArt	2.08	0.91
Wikipedia	1.91	0.65

Finding suspicious App

• Use malicious app's side channel



Finding suspicious App (Cont.)



Data Stealing Attacks

- 1. RECORD_AUDIO permission

Side-channel Attacks

- How frequently app uses the CPU resources
- Number of times schedule to use CPU



Behavior change

Challenge:

- keep low profile before the principal show up
- act aggressively afterwards

Solution:

Pearson correlation coefficient (r)

α	$1 - \beta$	r	n
0.05	0.8	0.90	7
0.05	0.8	0.95	5
0.05	0.8	0.98	4
0.05	0.8	0.9993	3
0.05	0.8	1	3

Collusion

Challenge:

Multiple apps sample at a lower rate but still collect sufficient information










- Grouping apps with same signature
- Detect link-installed apps
- > Ask user if less obvious recommendation

Self Protection

Use startForceground to start a service

Prevent it from killed by

KILL_BACKGROUND_PROCESSES



Evaluation and analysis

Effectiveness

• Defeat all 12 RIG Attacks

No.	RIG Attacks	Defeat	Attack Success Rate (SR)
1	Audio Recording	Yes	N/A
2	Bluetooth Data Stealing	Yes	N/A
3	Alarm Blocking	Yes	Fail (2/s)
4	Motion Detection On	Yes	Fail (1/3s)
5	WebMD: inferring disease condi- tions	Yes	RG (1/2s)
6	Twitter: inferring identities	Yes	RG (end-to-end)
7	Web Page Inference	Yes	RG (10/s)
8	Driving Route Inference	Yes	Fail (1/s)
9	Keylogger 1: TouchLogger	Yes	≤ 1/3s (1/3s)
10	Keylogger 2: Screenmilker	Yes	≤ 1/3s (1/3s)
11	Voice eavesdropping	Yes ⁵	Fail (1/3s)
12	UI inference	Yes ⁵	Fail (1/3s)

Utility Impacts and Performance

- 475 popular Apps from 27 categories on Google Play Store
 - 92 apps (19.3%) apps potentially needs to be closed
 - 8 apps (1.68%) may affect phone users' experience

App	Category	SR	oom_adj	Recoverable
Facebook	Social	< 1/3	9	Yes
Fox News	News & Magazines	< 1/3	9	Yes
Yelp	Travel & Local	< 1/3	9	Yes
Viber	Communication	1/1	5	Yes
Amazon	Shopping	2/1	9	Yes
The Weather Channel	Weather	< 1/3	9	Yes
FIFA	Sports	< 1/3	9	Yes
Temple Run 2	Games	10/1	9	Yes
Photo Grid	Photography	< 1/3	9	Yes
Adobe Reader	Productivity	< 1/3	9	Yes

Overhead

• CPU & Memory usage

Two Nexus5 phones with 250 apps installed on each

- In ward mode, 5% CPU Resource, 40MB Memory
- Out of ward mode, < 1% CPU

• Battery Usage

Two Nexus5 phones with 50 apps installed on each

- In ward mode, $0.12\% \sim 0.18\%$ per hour
- Out of ward mode, $0.75\% \sim 1.05\%$ per day
- Estimate a day, $0.84 \sim 1.18\%$ per day



Discussion and future work

• **Detection and Separation**A more accurate identification of malicious activities will help

- Background process protection

 Protect background process at minimal cost
- Sanitization

 Thoroughly clean up the principals' execution environment after the program stop running
- Possible side-channel attack on iOS / WatchOS



Conclusion

> Serious of RIG attacks on Android

IoT systems are also vulnerable

>App Guardian

- App level protection
- Uses side channel to protect principle

Thank you!